2025.02.01 【イベント】Fusion Centerセミナー(話題提供者:Tamás Solymosi: Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)が開催されます(2月10日)。
【日 時】 2025年2月10日(月) 15:00~17:00 (予定)
【場 所】 15202教室(15号館・高輪校舎)
【Zoom】 https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81449559541
ミーティング ID: 814 4955 9541
パスコード: 682569
【講演者】 Tamás Solymosi (Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest)
講演者の研究業績については以下のサイトを参照。
研究業績: https://scholar.google.co.jp/citations?user=QYA3PaoAAAAJ&hl=ja
【専門領域】 ゲーム理論
【発表論文】
Title: Core-related allocations in tree enterprise games
Abstract:
We consider a multi-agent decision situation where cooperation is possible but constrained by a hierarchical structure among the agents. The dependency relations are assumed to form a rooted tree graph. The root of the tree represents a “crucial” resource, while each other node represents an agent with a given profit-making potential that can only be realized if all agents along the path to the root also participate. Accessing the “crucial” resource involves a fixed cost.
We study stable allocations in such tree enterprise situations via solutions of associated cooperative games, called tree enterprise games. The value of a coalition of agents is determined by the total potential profits of its members who are connected to the root through other coalition members, subtracting the fixed cost of the “crucial” resource, which does not depend on the coalition being served. We examine the core of tree enterprise games and show that, under reasonable assumptions, it is non-empty and can be described by a polynomial-size system of linear constraints. This implies that the nucleolus of tree enterprise games can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, the algorithm solely requires the parameters of the tree enterprise situation; there is no need to explicitly generate all the exponentially many coalition values and use a general-purpose algorithm for nucleolus computation.
Two well-known special types of tree enterprise games are peer group games and bankruptcy games. The above-mentioned results concerning the core and nucleolus for these games are already well established. In the talk, we present some new observations regarding the less-studied Gately value for both types of games.
【講演、懇親会について】
〇 講演はハイブリット形式で行われます。
※ 本講演は、産業経済研究所2024年度研究プロジェクト「ブロックチェーン技術、情報および知的財産権に関する経済分析」(研究代表: 大石尊之)と情報科学融合領域センターの共催セミナーとなります。
担当幹事
大石 尊之 (情報科学融合領域センター所員、経済学部)